We study the welfare e¤ects of government-backed FDIs in Africa's farmlands. We build an occupational choice model featuring four mechanisms driving these e¤ects. First, local farming is subject to social arrangements prescribing that farmers share their crop surplus with kin. Second, proceeds from land investment deals are invested to make modern inputs a¤ordable to local farmers. Third, these deals cause some farmers to shift to wage employment. Fourth, they also entrench export-oriented agriculture, at the expense of local markets. We show that three conditions are su¢ cient for such deals to make local people better o¤: (i) the state has a high capacity and willingness to negotiate deals that bene…t local people; (ii) these deals create enough jobs; (iii) wage employment make displaced farmers better o¤. Ful…lling these three conditions, however, may con ‡ict with the interests of pro…t-maximizing foreign investors.
Introduction
We analyze the e¤ects of international land investment deals on the well-being of people living in the targeted community, highlighting the mechanisms driving these e¤ects.
We develop a model of occupational choice under foreign direct investments (FDIs) in farmlands. Local farmers whose farmland is leased to foreign companies either use the remaining farmland to grow a subsistence crop or shift into wage employment as labourers of the foreign-owned company leasing their land. We model the e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands on the well-being of local populations as resulting from an exogenous change in the quantity of local land leased to foreign investors. FDIs in farmlands-referred to as "land grabs" by their critics-are the purchase or lease of farmland by food-insecure nations and by private investors in poor countries for the purpose of securing their own food supplies and/or to produce biofuel (Daniel and (Cotula et al., 2009 ). In Mozambique, for example, the World Bank estimates that the demand for farmland from foreign investors is more than twice the total quantity of land being cultivated in the country (Deininger and Songwe, 2009 ). In its 2011 Report 4 , the US-based Oakland Institute reveals that "in 2009 alone nearly 60 million hectares-an area the size of France-was purchased or leased in Africa."
Government-backed FDIs in
In its 2011 Country Report for Ethiopia, the Oakland Institute also reveals that, since 2008, at least 3,619,509 hectares of land have been sold or leased to foreign investors. In its 2011 Country Report for Mali, the corresponding …gure was 819,567 hectares of fertile land in 2010, much of which involves crops for biofuels. It is also reported that, although they oppose the deals, most local communities in Mali a¤ected by foreign acquisition of peasants' farmland are forced to contend with serious disruptions and threats to their livelihoods due to a poor ability to organize socially (Oakland Institute, 2011) . Drawing on these …gures as well as on reports of social uprisings in some rural communities in Africa, critics of land investment deals suggest that a government that is acting in the best interests of its communities will not approve the sale or lease of farmlands to foreigners (Cotula et al., 2009 In this paper, we restrict our focus on the welfare e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands. Suppose that foreign investors are acting on behalf of a wealthy, but food-insecure, country, such that the primary reason for the investment is to secure its long term food security. Assume that such international investment deals reduce total farmland available to local farmers.
This may either lead to the displacement of local farmers, or to the reduction in farm size, which critics of such deals argue are the culprit of their perceived unpopularity. Now, suppose that the government uses the proceeds from land investment deals to subsidize the costs to local farmers of modernizing their farming methods so as to increase acreage yields.
Modernization may involve the use of commercial inputs such as seeds and fertilizers, as well as the building of locks and dams to improve the practice of irrigation farming. living, such as in the form of high food prices. We then argue that ful…lling these three conditions, however, may con ‡ict with the interests of pro…t-maximizing foreign investors.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the …rst theoretical analysis of the welfare implications of FDIs in Africa's farmlands, although many case studies of, and reports on, The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the environment in which such investments occur. Section 3 discusses the welfare e¤ects of these land deals.
Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.
The Setup
Government-backed FDIs in farmlands is a fast growing phenomenon which raises concerns with respect to the welfare of local populations. In this section, we develop a framework to capture the potential e¤ects of foreign acquisition of African farmlands and also highlight the mechanisms driving these e¤ects.
Consider a rural community populated by a unit mass of ex-ante homogeneous agents, which we have referred to as peasants. The economy is endowed with a …xed stock of land, Z, which can be used to produce crops for either quasi-subsistence or commercial purposes. Land is the property of the state. The government allocates some of the land to peasants (N ) for subsistence use (including farming, livestock herding, hunting or foraging) and leases part of it to a representative foreign …rm (F ), at a price, p z , per unit of land leased. We assume that proceeds from farmland leased to the foreign …rm are benevolently allocated to make high-quality seeds and fertilizers a¤ordable for peasants so as to boost modern inputs use in farming.
Total farmland used by peasants is denoted by Z N and total farmland leased or sold to the foreign …rm is denoted by Z F , with
Each peasant has a choice between subsistence farming (s = 1) and wage employment (s = 0) as their source of livelihood. Wage employment yields a wage, !, which is used to purchase an imported substitute for the domestically grown subsistence crop.
For each peasant, the payo¤ of choosing occupation s in the presence of international land investments is given by his level of consumption c (s):
V s denotes the quantity of food consumed when the peasant has occupation s:
where c m is the quantity of an imported substitute of the subsistence crop that is consumed when displaced peasants shift to wage employment as their new source of livelihood and c 1 denotes auto-consumption of subsistence output by a peasant involved in quasi-subsistence farming.
A peasant who chooses occupation s = 0, faces the following budget constraint for purchasing imported food:
where p m denotes the relative price of the imported substitute and !, the labor wage.
Quasi-Subsistence Livelihood
An important feature of this rural community is that peasants face social pressures to hold on to their harvested surplus, if any. We use to denote the fraction of a peasant's harvest that he is able to protect from the social obligation to share his surplus with members of the community, including extended family members. To borrow the terminology used by Alby and Auriol (2011) , one can think of 1 as a community or extended family tax.
A.1. Given his harvest, y, and the average harvest in the community, y, the share of his own harvest that a peasant involved in quasi-subsistence farming is able to protect from the social obligation to share with kin, , is strictly decreasing in his economic status within the community:
where " 2 (0; 1) is an e¢ ciency parameter.
When y= y > 1, the peasant with harvest y will be said to have harvested a surplus relative to his subsistence need, which is de…ned by the average crop harvest, y. The peasant with a harvest of y= y < 1 has a crop de…cit and thus may receive handouts from the rest of the community, as a mutual help mechanism. Only when y= y = 1 will a peasant be able to protect all his harvest from kin. Assumption A:1 states that having a harvest surplus relative to the community average exposes the peasant to social predation in the community, which creates a disincentive to exert a high farming modernization e¤ort, in a sense we will make more precise below.
Production of the subsistence crop requires farmland, z, and a composite input in quantity e, denoting, for example, seeds and fertilizers. The level of harvest for a local subsistence farmer who uses a quantity e of a composite input on a farm of size z is thus:
where + = 1, with ; 2 (0; 1). We take the level of commercial input use, e, as a measure of local farmer's modernization e¤ort.
A local farmer's level of auto-consumption thus is given by
where p e e denotes production costs, measured in units of subsistence good, and p e , the exogenously given per unit cost.
Combining Assumption A:1 with (2.5), we obtain a typical farmer's level of autoconsumption as follows:
p e e: (2.6)
In other words, the lower the average harvest, y, the lower the level of auto-consumption for a typical local farmer.
Optimal Use of Modern Inputs
As is the case in most rural societies, assume that all local farmers receive an equal plot of farmland (Seavoy, 2000) , such that they face a land use constraint of zn = Z N , where n 2 [0; 1] denotes the total number of peasants involved in quasi-subsistence farming. We can then use (2.1) to obtain per capita farm size among local farmers as follows:
where Z Z F Z N . We can then combine (2.7) with (2.4) to obtain a typical local farmer's harvest as follows:
Since all local farmers are assumed to receive an equal amount of farmland, average crop harvest in the community is given by
where e > 0 is the average farming modernization e¤ort by local farmers as a whole. The average harvest in the community, y, therefore embodies the subsistence farming norms embedded in e, the average farming modernization e¤ort in the community. Substituting (2.8) and (2.9) into (2.6) and rearranging yields a typical local farmer's auto-consumption level as follows:
In other words, subsistence farming norms are an important determinant of local farmers' well-being. In particular, the average farming modernization e¤ort within the local farming community, e, and a farmer's own modernization e¤ort, e, are strategic complements in his level of auto-consumption, c 1 . Since e is set externally from a local farmer's point of view, his own modernization e¤ort (as measured by the level of use of modern input) may be socially suboptimal. A question of interest is therefore whether international acquisition of local farmland that displaces some local farmers can correct for this externality.
To address this issue, assume that the government benevolently invests the proceeds from international acquisition of local farmland in the subsidization of the cost of modernizing local farming. More formally, let
where > 0 denotes the status quo per unit cost level, is a positive scale operator measuring the e¢ ciency of public investment, p z Z F , in the reduction of farming modernization costs. To ensure that prices are always non-negative, we assume that
This feature of the cost of farming modernization provides a channel through which international acquisition of local farmland can improve the lives of local farmers. We will return to this issue further below.
The Foreign-Owned Company
The representative foreign-owned company produces a cash crop solely for export using rented capital, K F , leased or purchased farmland, Z F , and hired labor, L F . The cash crop is produced according to the following Cobb-Douglas function:
where , and are factor shares satisfying the constant return to scale condition + + = 1, with ; ; 2 (0; 1). The labour input constraint is given by L F 1 n; (2.13) where 1 n denotes the total number of displaced peasants who shift to wage employment as their new source of livelihood. Under perfect competition, the foreign-owned company pays a market-clearing wage of
to labourers and rents an amount of capital, K F , that solves the following equation:
At the end of this process, the foreign company claims a surplus of
As the foreign-owned company is a price-taker in capital markets, 5 the optimal level of capital used is given by
(2.16) Substituting (2.16) into (2.14) gives the following market-clearing wage:
5 This is likely to be the case, when the foreign …rm borrows on international markets.
Clearly, foreign acquisition of peasants'land (i.e., an exogenous increase in Z F ) tends to raise the wage rate received by displaced peasants who are employed as labourers in the foreign-owned company, although the magnitude of this e¤ect depends on the labour share among production inputs, . For example, if production described by this function is highly capital-intensive, the labour share will be relatively small, and the wage e¤ect of foreign acquisition of peasants' farmland may be negligible. In this context, there will be little induced reallocation of peasants from subsistence activities to wage employment, with the result that average farm size in the community decreases.
But the positive e¤ects of foreign land acquisition do not only operate through the reallocation of labour. They may also arise through a change in peasants'labour e¤ort in subsistence farming, as we show below.
FDIs in Farmlands and Local Farmers'Use of Modern Inputs
How does international acquisition of local farmland a¤ect a peasant's farming modernization e¤ort? To address this question, we …rst compute the payo¤ of a peasant involved in subsistence farming. We then combine (2.2) with (2.3), and (2.10) to get the following payo¤:
V 1 (e; e; n; Z F ) = e " e
(1 ") Z Z F n p e e: (2.18)
Observe from (2.18) that international acquisition of local farmland has two e¤ects on the payo¤ of subsistence farming. On the one hand, it tends to reduce farmland available to local people (the term
). On the other hand, it reduces the marginal cost of exerting a high farming e¤ort (the term p e as de…ned in (2.11)). Which of these two e¤ects dominates determines the net e¤ect that international acquisition of local farmland has on the optimal farming e¤ort chosen by a typical local farmer, as we show below. For an interior solution, this maximization problem can be written as follows, using (2.7): (ii) It rises with an exogenous increase in the average modernization e¤ort in the rural community: @e=@ e > 0:
(iii) International acquisition of local farmland (i.e., an exogenous increase in Z F ) has an ambiguous e¤ect on a local farmer's modernization e¤ort:
and @e=@Z F < 0, if
is a direct implication of the production technology being constantto-return to scale in land and the composite modern input, as shown in (2.8). Proposition 1-(ii) suggests that subsistence farming norms that lower the average farming modernization e¤ort adversely a¤ect peasants'well-being, in the sense that they tend to discourage e¤ort to modernize farming through the use of modern inputs such as high-yielding seeds and fertilizers. The social obligation to share any crop surplus with other members of the peasant community discourages such e¤ort because it suggests that accumulating a harvested surplus is pointless, and will face a punitive community tax of 1 . Proposition 1-(iii) thus suggests that land leases to foreigners by a benevolent government, if well negotiated as per condition (2.20), can counter the adverse e¤ects of subsistence farming norms that impede high modernization e¤ort. Only when land leases to foreigners are poorly negotiated, as described by (2.21), will the leases reduce farmers'use of modern inputs.
The Welfare E¤ects of FDIs in Farmlands
In this section, we analyze the welfare e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands, highlighting the mechanisms that drive these e¤ects. Recall that the level of use of modern input by a typical peasant in this environment is assumed to be positively related to the average level of modern input use in the peasant community. To the extent that foreign acquisition of peasants' farmland is compensated by subsidization programs that reduce the costs of modernizing farming practices, such an externality can be countered, thereby nudging the level of farming modernization towards its socially optimal level. This e¤ect on farming practices is one of the rationales for foreign acquisition of peasants'farmland. A second rationale involves the labour market, as international acquisition of local farmland displaces some farmers, pushing them into wage employment as hired labourers in the foreign-owned company.
This reallocation of human resources away from subsistence farming can, depending upon its magnitude, ease the pressure on farmland caused by international acquisition of local farmland.
Taken individually, however, each of these two rationales can be undermined by any of the following issues. In relation to any prospective reduction in the cost of modernizing subsistence farming, we should consider the compensation that comes in the form of the subsidization of commercial inputs. A problem can arise if the government is not accountable to the peasant community, in which case the compensation may not be received in full. Even if the government were to act benevolently, such that all the proceeds from leasing farmland to the foreign-owned company are totally invested in the subsidization of commercial inputs used by subsistence farmers, there is also the question of whether the government has the capacity to negotiate adequate compensation with the foreign-owned company. The potentially negative outcome is that the compensation received will be too small to have any signi…cant impact on peasants'livelihoods.
We can also consider the displacement of local farmers induced by foreign acquisition of local farmland. We assume that displaced farmers shift into wage employment. There is no problem in this regard if the production process adopted by the foreign-owned company is labour-intensive. If this process is either capital-intensive, or creates few backward and forward linkages, then the potential for job creation may be negligible: this could result in a more than proportional reduction in farm size in the peasant community. Below, we provide an analysis of these rationales, keeping track of the related potential problems.
FDIs in Farmlands and the Payo¤ to Subsistence Farming
In this subsection, we discuss the e¤ects of international acquisition of local farmland on the payo¤ to subsistence farming. At this stage, it is important to note that since peasants are presumed identical, in equilibrium, if one peasant obeys the subsistence farming norm, e, all of them will obey it, thus leading to an identical e¤ort level of e = e. Therefore, on the basis of (2.19), and making use of (2.11), we obtain the equilibrium level of farming modernization e¤ort as follows:
With the determination of the equilibrium level of farming modernization e¤ort, we can now compute the equilibrium payo¤ to a peasant who makes the occupation decision s = 1, by substituting the equilibrium e¤ort level back into (2.18), and re-arranging terms:
Expression (3.2) shows that international acquisition of peasants'farmland has two opposite e¤ects on a typical peasant's welfare. First, there is a negative e¤ect from the reduction in per capita farmland, z = Z Z F n , used to grow the subsistence crop. Second, there is a positive e¤ect due to the fact that proceeds from international land investment deals are invested in the reduction of the cost of modernizing subsistence farming.
Di¤erentiating (3.2), it can be established that
On the other hand, it follows from (3.2) that
We have just established the following proposition cause a reduction in farm size in the peasant community. Arguably, for this to happen, the foreign-owned company's production operations must be su¢ ciently labour-intensive, as we show further below.
FDIs in Farmlands and the Payo¤ to Wage-Employment
Recall that in the presence of international acquisition of local farmland, peasants initially in unit mass have the option to pursue two di¤erent occupations: Subsistence farming or wage employment. A peasant who elects to supply labour earns a wage, !, and uses it to …nance consumption of an imported substitute. Using (2.2), (2.3) and (2.17), we can write the utility payo¤ associated with this occupational strategy as follows:
where
is as found in (2.17). The following Proposition thus can be established by di¤erentiation of expression (3.3).
Proposition 3. International land investment deals (i.e., an increase in Z F ) raises the payo¤ to wage employment, as does an increase in the number of subsistence farmers, n.
However, high food prices (an increase in p m ) reduce it.
Both of these results can be easily expected because both n and Z F a¤ect the wage received by laborers. With both Propositions 2 and 3 in hand, we can now proceed to determine the equilibrium allocation of the peasant community's human resources across activities (subsistence farming and wage employment). We undertake this task below.
Equilibrium E¤ects of FDIs in Farmlands
When the situation is described by (n; p m ; p z ; Z F ), a peasant will choose to remain in the community and undertake subsistence farming if and only if the associated utility payo¤ exceeds the utility payo¤ from wage employment:
The peasant will choose to leave subsistence farming and become a labourer in the foreignowned company if and only if
Peasants are indi¤erent as to which occupation they will pursue if Let (n; p m ; p z ; Z F ) = V 1 (n; p z ; Z F ) V 0 (n; p m ; Z F ) express the net gain from engaging in subsistence farming. Taking the partial derivative of the function (:) with respect to Z F yields:
where Z F @ (n; p; p z ; Z F ) =@Z F . In other words, Z F is the algebraic sum of two e¤ects and may thus be either positive or negative. On the one hand, Proposition 2 states that the sign of the term
is ambiguous. If condition (2.21) holds, then the original downward-sloping curve shifts down and to the left as in …gure 1. In that case, from Proposition 3, the term
is strictly positive. This means that the net e¤ect, Z F , will be unambiguously negative:
If condition (2.20) holds instead, the term in (3.4) will be strictly positive. In …gure 1, this corresponds to the shift of the downward-sloping dark-blue curve up and to the right. In this case, the sign of the net e¤ect, Z F , is ambiguous. This sign depends on the magnitude of the e¤ect seen in (3.5) . This same term also illustrates that the magnitude of this e¤ect depends on the =p m ratio. The term denotes the labor share in the production process used by the foreign company, while p m denotes the relative price of the imported substitute for the local subsistence crop. The higher the =p m ratio, the greater the bene…t of foreign acquisition of local farmland in terms of wage employment. This ratio is higher either when the foreign-owned company adopts a su¢ ciently labour-intensive technology (i.e., is su¢ ciently high for a given p m ), or when the imported substitute for the domestic subsistence good is relatively cheap (i.e., p m is su¢ ciently low for a given ). When this is the case, international acquisition of local farmland will cause comparatively more peasants to shift from subsistence farming to wage employment as their new source of livelihood, with the result that Z F < 0. The following lemma has hereby been established:
Lemma 1. The function (:) has the following properties: Since wages adjust, local people will continue to change occupations until the net payo¤ of doing so is zero:
Therefore, the equilibrium size of the peasant community, n , solves equation (3.6) . On the basis of lemma 1, the implicit function theorem may be applied to obtain the properties of the function representing n :
Proposition 4. If condition (2.21) is ful…lled, or if =p m is su¢ ciently high, then international acquisition of local farmland induce a shift to wage employment (i.e., @n =@Z F < 0), whereas a high cost of living (as determined by the relative price of the imported good, p m ) increases it (i.e., @n =@p m > 0).
With proposition 4 in hand, we can now properly begin our investigation of the welfare e¤ects of international acquisition of local farmland.
FDIs in Farmlands and the Welfare of Local Populations
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands on the economic well-being of local populations (including subsistence farmers and wage earners). Since, in equilibrium, peasants and wage earners achieve the same level of utility irrespective of their occupational choice (otherwise peasants would continue to move from the low-utility occupation to the high-utility one), we can use (3.6) and (3.7) to rewrite this shared utility payo¤ as follows:
The e¤ect of international land investment deals on community members'welfare can therefore be characterized by the partial derivative of the functionV (p m ; p z ; :) with respect to Z F :
We know from lemma 1 and from proposition 4 that
if the =p m ratio is su¢ ciently high. However, as shown in Proposition 2, the sign of the …rst term on the right-hand side of (3.9) is ambiguous, and depends on the land price, p z . A lower p z may re ‡ect either the government's inability to negotiate adequate compensation for farmland leased to the foreign company or public sector corruption due to lack of transparency and accountability, and would lead to
while the reverse would hold in the presence of strong state capacity and sound institutional transparency and accountability.
Observe that even if the inequality in (3.11) holds, the sign of
positive if the =p m ratio is large enough to o¤set the negative e¤ect in (3.11). Likewise, even if the inequality in (3.10) were to be violated, the sign of
positive if the price of land, p z , is large enough for the positive e¤ect,
to o¤set the non-positive e¤ect,
We have just established the su¢ cient conditions for land investment deals to improve the welfare of local populations: This is likely to be the case if land investment deals are primarily designed to satisfy the interests of foreign countries, as is assumed in this paper. So long as the price of food imports is su¢ ciently low, this may provide a third mechanism through which land investment deals improve welfare in the local community. 
Conclusion
We studied the welfare e¤ects of FDIs in farmlands. We highlighted four speci…c mechanisms driving these e¤ects. First, subsistence farming takes place in a context where the culture of forced mutual help e¤ectively amounts to a community tax on peasants who obtain a harvest surplus through the use of modern farm inputs. This community tax stems from the social obligation to share their harvested surplus with less fortunate kin.
The social pressure created by this informal arrangement entrenches a subsistence farming norm where no peasant has an incentive to modernizing subsistence farming.
Second, farmland leased or sold to pro…t-oriented foreign companies generates public funds that are invested in the subsidization of the costs of modernizing subsistence farming.
This may include subsidies on fertilizer and high-yielding seeds, as well as the construction of locks and dams to encourage the practice of irrigation farming. This feature of the model provides a role for international acquisition of local farmland to promote the use of modern inputs by local farmers.
Third, peasants displaced by international acquisition of local farmland shift to wage employment as employees in foreign-owned companies. How rewarding this transition is depends directly on the magnitude of job opportunities created by these land deals.
In particular, the degree of labour-intensity of the technology adopted by the foreign-owned company is a constraint on peasants' shift to wage employment. The shift to wage employment is greater when the foreign-owned company uses a more labour-intensive technology.
Finally, farmland leased or sold to foreign investors is used solely to grow an export crop, thus entrenching export-oriented agriculture as a feature of international land investment deals. As a result, displaced farmers who shift to wage employment become dependent on imports that substitute for the subsistence crop they previously grew in their community.
They must …nance imports of this substitute with their labour earnings. The cost of living associated with this new livelihood introduces a channel through which land investment deals may reduce welfare among local population, particularly in the context of a global food crisis. When the price of imported food is too high, the welfare of displaced peasants decreases, causing them to retreat to subsistence livelihoods. Only when the price of imports is su¢ ciently low will the situation of displaced peasants improve with this transition to wage employment.
We show that a model that incorporates these features can help identify su¢ cient conditions for foreign acquisition of Africa's farmlands to make local populations better o¤: (i)
State capacity and willingness to negotiate land investment deals that bene…t local populations must be su¢ ciently high; (ii) there must be su¢ cient sources of alternative livelihoods for displaced farmers; and (iii) the shift to wage employment must make displaced peasants better o¤ compared to pre-FDIs subsistance livelihood.
Condition (iii) may be obtained by regulations prescribing that the domestic market becomes the primary focus of land investment deals, while condition (ii) can be guaranteed by regulations prescribing the use of labour-intensive technologies, so as to absorb the rural labour surplus. However, on the one hand, regulations supporting the realization of conditions (ii) and (iii) may be di¢ cult to pass if the political and institutional reforms needed to support condition (i) are not passed …rst. If these regulations and reforms could be put into place before negotiating with foreign countries and companies for the
